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THE VALIDITY OF STATE TENDER OFFER
STATUTES: SEC RULE 14d-2(b) AND
POST-KIDWELL FEDERAL DECISIONS
In 1968, Congress enacted the Williams Act' to regulate tender offers.2 Under the Williams Act, a tender offeror must disclose certain pertinent information to the target company's shareholders concurrently
with the commencement of an offer.3 The Williams Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder also contain substantive provisions that
establish a minimum offer period4 and govern withdrawals of tendered
shares,' pro-rata purchases,' and increases in the purchase price during
the offer period.7 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
recently promulgated rule 14d-2 to define the commencement date of a
tender offer.' SEC rule 14d-2 provides that a bidder's public announcement which discloses certain information will commence the tender offer.' The specific commencement date of a tender offer under the
Williams Act is significant because commencement of the offer triggers
the Act's disclosure and substantive requirements. 10
' 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The Williams Act amended
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. III 1979),
by adding sections 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(f).
2 A general definition of a tender offer is a public invitation to all of the shareholders
of a target company to sell their shares to the offeror at a specific price. See Note, The
Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1251 (1973). See generally Note, What is a Tender Offer?, 37 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 908 (1980). Congress enacted the Williams Act to provide shareholders confronted with a cash tender offer adequate information and time to make independent, intelligent investment decisions concerning the offer. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1,
35 (1977); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin [19681 U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEWS 2811, 2812-14; S. REP. No.
550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1967).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976).
Once commencement occurs, a tender offer must remain open continuously for a
minimum of twenty business days. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1980).

, A tendering shareholder may withdraw tendered shares within fifteen business
days and after sixty days from the commencement of an offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1980).
' Under the Williams Act, tender solicitors must purchase pro-rata all of the shares
that investors tender during the first ten days of the offer, if the total number of shares
tendered during the ten day period exceeds the number sought. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976).
' Where a bidder increases the consideration offered to tendering shareholders before
the expiration of the offer, the bidder must pay the increased price to every tendering
shareholder regardless of whether the shareholders tendered before or after the price increase. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1976).
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (1980); see text accompanying notes 18-25 infra.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1980).
10 See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-16384 (Nov. 29, 1979), reprintedin
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,373, at 82,582 [hereinafter cited as
SEC Release No. 34-16384]; notes 4-6 supra.
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Tender offers are subject to additional regulation under various corporate takeover statutes in thirty-six states.1 These state takeover
statutes potentially impair the effectiveness and increase the expected
cost of tender offers 2 by imposing on bidders disclosure and substantive
requirements that differ significantly from the provisions of the
Williams Act."3 In particular, before a tender offer may begin under state
" See ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.57.010-.120 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1264 to -1264.14
(1980); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-51.5-101 to -108 (Supp. 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-456
to -469 (West Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. §§
22-1901 to -1915 (1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 417E-1 to -15 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to
-1513 (Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §§ 137.51 to .70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-3.1-1 to -11 (Burns Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 502.101 to .215 (Supp.
1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1276 to -1285 (1974); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 292.570-.991 (Supp.
1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1500-:1512 (West Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§§ 801-817 (West Supp. 1980); MD. CORP. & ASS'NS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-901 to -908 (Supp. 1980);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110C, §§ 1-13 (West Supp. 1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
451.901-.917 (West Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01-.13 (West Supp. 1980); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 75-72-101 to -121 (Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 409.500 to .565 (1978); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 21-2401 to -2417 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 78-376 to .3778 (1973); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 421-A:1 to :15 (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:5-1 to -19 (West Supp. 1979);
N.Y. BUs. CORP. LAW §§ 1600-1614 (McKinney Supp. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78B-1 to -11
(1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71 §§ 414-21 (Supp.
1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1980); S.C. CODE §§ 35-2-10 to -110
(Supp. 1979); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 47-32-1 to -47 (Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
48-2101 to -2114 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-1 to -13 (1977); VA. CODE §§ 13.1-528 to -541
(1980); WISC. STAT. ANN. §§ 552.01-.25 (West Special Pamphlet 1980). Texas regulates corporate tender offers through administrative rules rather than through a takeover statute.
See Tex. Administrative Guidelines for Minimum Standards in Tender Offers §§
065.15.00.100-.800, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 11 55,671 to 55,682.
12 The cash tender offer is normally an extremely effective method of acquiring control
of a "hostile" corporation because the tender offer combines speed and surprise. See Note,
The Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes: A Response To Great Western, 53
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 872, 872-73 n.2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as A Response To Great Western].
According to one statistical study, 80% of all tender offers during the period of 1956 to 1979
were at least partially successful. See Austin, Tender Offer Update: 1978-1979, 15 MERGERS
& ACQUISITIONS 13, 14 (1980). State takeover statutes potentially impair the effectiveness of
tender offers, however, by giving the target corporation's management time to take defensive actions. See MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 497 (7th Cir. 1980), appealfiled sub nom.
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 49 U.S.L.W. 3533 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1981) (No. 80-1188); Great Western
United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1278 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G.
BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 227-29 (1977);
Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the
Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Fischel]; Tiger, The PennsylvaniaTakeover Disclosure Law: A Statute Waiting To Be Invalidated, 25 VILL. L. REV. 458, 458-59 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Tiger]. Defensive tactics
available to target management include advising shareholders not to tender their shares,
commencing legal actions against bidders, repurchasing shares, issuing additional shares,
negotiating a defensive merger, increasing dividends and entering into restrictive loan
agreements. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 234
(1973) [hereinafter cited as ARANOW & EINHORN].
13 Unlike the Williams Act, most state takeover statutes require potential tender
offerors to make specified advance disclosures before commencing the solicitation of shares.
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law, many state takeover statutes require advance disclosure of the information that causes the commencement of a tender offer under SEC
rule 14d-2.14 Once a tender offer commences pursuant to rule 14d-2, a bidder will often be unable to comply with the substantive provisions of
both the Williams Act and the applicable state takeover provisions."
Since state takeover statutes are extremely burdensome and often
directly conflict with the Williams Act, tender offerors have challenged
the constitutionality of the offending statutes on preemption'" and commerce clause grounds.
Under SEC rule 14d-2(a)(5), a tender offer commences on the date
that the bidder first publishes or otherwise disseminates the offer to the
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(1) (Supp. 1980) (bidder required to give target not
less than 20 nor more than 60 days advance notice); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 72(a) (Purdon
Supp. 1980) (bidder required to give 20 days advance notice); VA. CODE § 13.1-531(a) (1980)
(bidder required to give 20 days advance notice). The practical effect of state advance
disclosure requirements is to impose a waiting period on the potential offeror during which
the target can take defensive measures. See note 12 supra. Additionally, while the Williams
Act does not provide for pre-offer determinations of whether an offer may proceed, several
state takeover statutes enable the target company and certain state officials to require
time-consuming pre-offer hearings on whether a bidder's solicitation of shares may commence. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 112 § 137.57 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); OHio REV.
CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B(1), (4) (1979); VA. CODE § 13.1-531(a)(iii) (1980). Although most state
takeover statutes restrict these hearings to the issue whether the bidder has made full and
fair disclosure, some statutes permit the parties to raise the issue of the offer's substantive
fairness. Compare VA. CODE § 13.1-531(a)(iii) (1980) (pre-offer hearing confined to issue of
whether offeror has given adequate advance disclosure) with ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 121 112, §
137.57(E) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980) (state official empowered to prohibit offer if offer appears
substantively inequitable).
" See text accompanying notes 20 & 27 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 28-30 infra.
"CThe supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2,
provides that federal law is the supreme law of the land. The supremacy clause provides the
basis for the preemption doctrine. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 490 (7th Cir. 1980).
The Supreme Court in Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977), set forth general
guidelines for determining whether a particular federal statute preempts a state law. Under
Jones, a valid federal law that expressly or implicitly excludes all state regulation in a particular field preempts all state statutes governing that field. Id. at 525-26. Even in the
absence of express or implicit preemption, however, federal legislation will preempt state
laws that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress. Id.; see Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
134 (1963).
" The commerce clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3,
grants Congress the power to regulate commerce among the several states. This affirmative grant of power also limits the power of the states to enact legislation that affects interstate commerce over which Congress has primary responsibility. See Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1976). The Supreme Court, in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), set forth the test for determining the validity of a state
statute under the commerce clause. The Pike Court stated that where a state statute
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local interest with only incidental effects
on interstate commerce, the statute is valid unless its burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the putative local benefits. Id. at 142.
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target corporation's shareholders.18 SEC rule 14d-2(b) further provides,
with two exceptions, that a bidder's press release, newspaper advertisement, or other public statement which discloses certain information
causes the tender offer to commence under rule 14d-2(a)(5).19 The information that causes commencement of the tender offer under rule
14d-2(b) when publicly disclosed is the identities of the bidder and the
target, the amount and class of shares sought, and the price offered."
The two exceptions under rule 14d-2(b) occur if, within five business days
after the bidder's initial public announcement, the bidder either publicly
withdraws the offer 21 or makes certain additional filings and
disclosures.22 If the bidder proceeds under the first exception by
withdrawing the offer, the bidder's initial public announcement will not
commence the tender offer. 2 Alternatively, if the bidder complies with
the filing and disclosure requirements of the second exception, the
tender offer commences on the date of such filings and disclosures, instead of on the date of the earlier public announcement.24 The practical
, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(a)(5) (1980).
" Id. at § 240.14d-2(b). The SEC designed rule 14d-2(b) to prevent bidders from publicly announcing the material terms of tender offers prior to the formal commencement of an
offer. SEC Release No. 34-16384, supra note 10, at 82,582. The Commission has stated that
pre-offer public announcements of tender offers force investors to make premature investment decisions on the basis of incomplete information. Id. Moreover, the SEC has stated
that advance public disclosures of tender solicitations cause the contest for corporate control to occur prior to the functioning of the Williams Act's shareholder protection provisions. Id. at 82,583.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(c) (1980). A bidder's public announcement that does not state
the amount and class of shares sought or the consideration which the offeror will pay does
not cause the tender offer to start. Id. § 240.14d-2(d). Moreover, the SEC has stated that a
public announcement by the target company or by another person having no relationship
with the bidder will not trigger the commencement of the tender offer under rule 14d-2(b).
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-16623 (March 5, 1980), reprinted in F. REG.
15521, 15521 (March 11, 1980) [hereinafter cited as SEC Release No. 34-16623]. But see Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,731, at 98,835 (3d
Cir. 1980) (indirect dissemination of price and quantity information by hostile target corporation held to constitute public announcement commencing tender offer). Practical circumstances, however, may force the offeror to confirm disclosures made in the target corporation's public announcement because a denial of the disclosures could result in liability
for material misrepresentations under § 14(e) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
Public confirmation by the bidder would, of course, cause the tender offer to commence
under SEC rule 14d-2(b). See SEC Release No. 34-16623, supra,at 15521.
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b)(1) (1980). The bidder may withdraw the tender offer by making a subsequent public announcement stating that the bidder has determined to discontinue the offer. Id.
- Id. § 240.14d-2(b)(2) (1980). To fall within the second exception to rule 14d-2(b), a bidder must comply with the filing requirements of rule 14d-3(a) and disclose to the target corporation's shareholders the information specified in rule 14d-6. Rule 14d-3(a) requires that
the bidder file with the SEC and deliver to the subject company and any other bidder who
has an offer outstanding for the subject company a Schedule 14D-1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(a)
(1980).
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b)(1) (1980).
2117 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b)(2)(i) (1980). But see id. § 240.14d-2(b)(2)(ii) (notwithstanding
rule 14d-2(b)(2)(i), § 14d-7 of '34 Act deemed to apply from date of initial public disclosure).

19811

RULE 14d-2(b)

1029

effect of rule 14d-2(b), therefore, is to require a tender offeror either to
commence or withdraw the offer within five business days after publicly
announcing the offer's material terms.'
SEC rule 14d-2(b) creates a direct and substantial conflict between
federal law and many state takeover statutes.2 6 State takeover statutes
typically require pre-offer public statements or announcements that
disclose the information which triggers commencement of the offer
under rule 14d-2(b)Y Compliance with these state advance disclosure requirements will commence the tender offer under the Williams Act
despite state statutes prohibiting commencement of the tender offer
until the conclusion of an applicable waiting period.' Conversely, by
forcing bidders to commence their offers before the expiration of the
state-mandated waiting period, SEC rule 14d-2(b) prevents the timely
operation of state substantive provisions." Therefore, where a state's
pre-offer, post-disclosure waiting period exceeds rule 14d-2(b)'s five
business day commence-or-withdraw period, tender offerors will be
unable to comply with both state and federal law."
Where the operation of a state's advance disclosure and pre-offer
waiting period provisions conflict irreconcilably with SEC rule 14d-2(b),
the valid federal rule"' preempts the state statutes. 2 In Kennecott Corp.
3
v. Smith"
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that SEC rule 14d-2(b)
directly conflicted with and, therefore, preempted New Jersey's advance
disclosure and pre-offer waiting period provisions. 4 In Smith, Kennecott
sought to acquire by cash tender offer a controlling interest in CurtissWright Corporation, a company headquartered in New Jersey. On November 21, 1980, Kennecott publicly announced the proposed tender
offer for Curtiss-Wright. 6 Under SEC rule 14d-2(b), Kennecott had until

, See SEC Release No. 34-16623, supra note 20, at 15522. Upon commencement of the
tender offer, the bidder must be willing to accept immediately tendered shares for deposit.

Id.
' See SEC Release No. 34-16384, supra note 10, at 82,583; text accompanying notes
27-30 infra.
I See SEC Release No. 34-16384, supra note 10, at 82,583.
21Id. at 82,583-84; SEC Release No. 34-16623, supra note 20, at 15522; see note 13
supra.
SEC Release No. 34-16384, supra note 10, at 82,584.
Id. at 82,583-84; Rich & McSherry, Conflict Between Federaland State Regulation
of Tender Offers: The SEC's Challenge and New York's Response, 52 N.Y.B.J. 466, 469
(1980).
3,See text accompanying notes 66-106 infra.
See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973)
(proper approach to preemption question is to reconcile competing state and federal
schemes if possible).

- [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,731, at 98,829 (3d Cir. 1980).
3,Id. at 98,838; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-3 (West Supp. 1978) (20 day waiting period

provision); note 40 infra.
[1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,731, at 98,830.
[1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,731, at 98,830.
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November 28, five business days later, to commence the solicitation of
Curtiss-Wright shares." New Jersey's takeover statute, however, required Kennecott to announce publicly the tender offer at least twenty
days before commencing the solicitation of shares. 8 To protect its right
to proceed under the Williams Act, Kennecott brought suit in the
Federal District Court for the District of New Jersey seeking a declaratory judgment that the New Jersey takeover statute was unconstitutional as applied to Kennecott's tender offer. 9 Concluding that Kennecott had shown neither irreparable harm if an injunction did not issue
nor a likelihood of success on the merits, the district court denied Kennecott's motion for preliminary injunctive relief.40 Kennecott subsequently
appealed.
Holding that Kennecott had shown the requisite probability of success on the merits and potential for irreparable harm,4" the circuit court
reversed the lower court's denial of preliminary injunctive relief. 2 With
respect to the issue of Kennecott's probability of success on the merits,
the Smith court reasoned that federal law required Kennecott to commence the tender offer at a time when New Jersey law prohibited commencement. As a result of these differing time requirements, the Smith
" Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1980).
[1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,731, at 98,830; see N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 49:5-3 (West Supp. 1978). Even after the conclusion of New Jersey's twenty day precommencement waiting period, Kennecott's offer could not proceed under New Jersey law
until the conclusion of a state pre-offer fairness hearing. [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 97,731, at 98,830; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-8 (West Supp. 1978) (administrative approval necessary before tender solicitation can begin); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-4 (West
Supp. 1978) (necessary administrative order cannot issue prior to completion of pre-offer
hearing). New Jersey's takeover statute did not prescribe a specific completion deadline for
the pre-offer hearing. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5 (West Supp. 1978).
89 [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,731, at 98,831.
40 Id.
The district court reasoned that Kennecott's likelihood of success on the merits
was minimal because Kennecott could have avoided the conflict between federal and state
law by omitting from its announcement the number of shares sought and the offering price.
See i&; N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:47A-25.3(b) (1980). By omitting this information, Kennecott
would have fallen within the "safe harbor" provision of 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(d). Under this
safe harbor provision, a public announcement that does not disclose the price and number of
shares sought does not trigger the five business day commence-or-withdraw period under
rule 14d-2(b). 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1980); see note 20 supra.
" The Smith court found that Kennecott had shown the necessary element of irreparable harm because New Jersey's takeover statute injured through delay both the plaintiff
and the investing public. [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,731, at
98,836-37. The court reasoned that delays enhanced the ability of target companies to defeat
tender offers. Id. at 98,836 (citing MITE Corp. v. Dixon and Great W. United Corp. v.
Kidwell). The Smith court also observed that delay causes an offeror to incur substantial
financial costs if the offeror has borrowed funds to support the offer. Id. Moreover, the
court found that delay harmed investors by obstructing the free flow of essential investment information, thereby impairing investor decision-making freedom. Id. at 98,837.
42 [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,731, at 98,838.
13 Id.
at 98,830 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1980) and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-3 (West
Supp. 1978)).
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court found that Kennecott could not have simultaneously complied with
both federal and state law." The Smith court held, therefore, that SEC
rule 14d-2(b) preempted the New Jersey waiting period requirements.45
The Smith court, however, remanded to the district court for further
consideration of issues concerning the validity of other New Jersey provisions that did not directly conflict with SEC rule 14d-2(b).46
In Smith, New Jersey argued that Kennecott had failed to show probability of success on the merits because the company could have complied with both federal and state law by using New Jersey's "safe harbor" provision.47 Under this provision, Kennecott could have avoided
triggering the preemptive time requirements of rule 14d-2(b) by excluding from the firm's advance public announcement the offer price or the
number of shares sought. 8 Responding to this argument, the Smith
court observed that Kennecott would still have had to disclose the price
and quantity information to the target and that the target in turn would
have had to disseminate the information to the public.49 The Smith court
also reasoned that the only issue before the court was whether the effect
of New Jersey's statute on the course of action which Kennecott actually
pursued conflicted with rule 14d-2(b).50 The Smith court concluded,
therefore, that New Jersey's safe harbor provision did not save the New
Jersey takeover statute from impermissible conflict with SEC rule
14d-2(b)Y'
" Id. at 98,835.

,5 Id. at 98,838. The Smith court implicitly rejected New Jersey provisions, other than
the state's pre-offer waiting period requirement, that also delayed commencement of Kennecott's tender offer under 14d-2(b). See note 38 supra.
'a[1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,731, at 98,838; see Kennecott
Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206 (D.N.J. 1981); text accompanying notes 179-191 infra. The
Smith court indicated in dicta that the New Jersey takeover statute was unconstitutional
under the recent line of federal cases adopting Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell. [1980
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,731, at 98,834-35 (citing MITE Corp. v. Dixon,
Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, and Hi-Shear Indus. Inc v. Campbell); see text accompanying notes 118, 124 & 157 infra.
11[1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (COH) 97,731, at 98,835; see text accompanying note 48 infra.
" [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,731, at 98,835; see 17 C.F.R. §
240.14d-2(d) (1980); note 20 supra.
[1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,731, at 98,835; see note 20 supra.
[1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,731, at 98,835. Preemption
analysis focuses on whether a state law obstructs the operation of federal law in the circumstances of the particular case, rather than in all cases. Id. (citing Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977)).
51 [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,731, at 98,835, 98,838; see text
accompanying notes 111-14 infra. See also Canadian Pa. Enterprises, Inc. v. Krouse, 506 F.
Supp. 1192, 1204 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (holding Ohio takeover statute preempted by 14d-2(b)). In
addition to Smith, several state courts have found preemptive conflict between SEC rule
14d-2(b) and state takeover statutes that contain advance disclosure and pre-offer waiting
period requirements. See, e.g., G.M. Sub. Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc. [1979-1980 Transfer
binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,389, at 97,542 (Del. 1980) (Delaware's 20 day pre-offer
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In addition to the incompatability of SEC rule 14d-2(b) and many
state takeover statutes that require advance disclosures, rule 14d-2(b)
potentially conflicts with state statutes that require advance administrative approval of tender offers involving regulated industries.2 These
conflicts may occur where the necessary application for administrative
approval is made public and includes the information set forth in SEC
rule 14d-2(c).5' The filing of a public application containing the information set out in rule 14d-2 would trigger commencement of the tender offer under federal law despite the lack of necessary administrative approval under state law. 4 Recognizing the undesirability of this potential
conflict," the SEC has stated that bidders usually can avoid the conflict
by conditioning their solicitations on subsequent regulatory approval.
In Sun Life Group, Inc. v. Standard Life Insurance Co., 7 the District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana upheld the use of the SEC's approach for harmonizing rule 14d-2(b) with statutes requiring administrative approval of shifts in corporate control.
In Sun Life, the Indiana Insurance Commissioner interpreted Indiana's Insurance Holding Company Act59 to permit commencement under
SEC rule 14d-2(b) of a conditional tender offer for an Indiana insurance
company without advance regulatory approval." Relying on this interpretation, Sun Life Group, Inc. (Sun) applied for state administrative approval of a proposed tender offer for Standard Life Insurance Co. of Indiana (Standard).6 Since Sun's application for administrative approval was
a public document that contained the information set forth in SEC rule
14d-2, the filing required commencement of Sun's tender offer under
SEC rule 14d-2(b).6 In response to Sun's tender offer, Standard brought
waiting period preempted by SEC rule 14d-2(b)); Eure v. Grand Metro. Ltd. [1979-1980
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 197,383, at 97,528 (N.C. Super Ct. 1980) (North
Carolina's 30 day pre-offer waiting period preempted by SEC rule 14d-2(b)).

See SEC Release No. 34-16384, supra note 10, at 82,584.
Id.; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(c) (1980).
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) & (c) (1980).
SEC rule 14d-2(b) potentially conflicts with federal statutes, as well as state
statutes, that require public applications for advance administrative approval of tender offers for companies in regulated industries. See SEC Release No. 34-16384, supra note 10, at
82,584; see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1842 (1976) (regulatory approval for takeover of bank holding
52

companies required by Bank Holding Co. Act); 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)

(regulatory approval for takeover of air carrier required by Federal Aviation Act).
-1 SEC Release No. 34-16384, supra note 10, at 82,584; SEC Release No. 34-16623, supra
note 20, at 15522.
11[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,314, at 97,115 (S.D. Ohio
1980).
, See id at 97,117-18.
"

IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-23-2 (Burns Supp. 1979).
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)

97,314, at 97,117. Under Indiana law, the Indiana Insurance Commissioner must approve certain transactions, including
tender offers, that shift control of Indiana insurance companies. Id. at 97,116.
5'

51

d.

Id. at 97,117.
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suit seeking to enjoin Sun's solicitation of shares.6 3 Sun argued that Indiana law prohibited the making of a tender offer conditioned upon subsequent regulatory approval until the Indiana Insurance Commission had
approved the change of control." Construing Indiana law as consistent
with SEC rule 14d-2(b), the Sun Life court adopted the position of the
Indiana Insurance Commissioner and denied Standard's motion for a preliminary injunction."
Several states have reacted to the SEC's promulgation of rule
14d-2(b) by either amending their takeover statutes to conform with the
new rule6 1 or by challenging the validity of the SEC rule. Two recent
cases have involved challenges of rule 14d-2(b). In State of Ohio ex reL
Krouse v. SEC," the Ohio Commissioner of Securities brought an action
against the SEC and claimed that rule 14d-2(b) exceeds the rule-making
authority of the SEC.69 The district court in Krouse concluded that the
Ohio Commissioner lacked standing to maintain the suit because private
litigants could more properly challenge the rule.6 In the second case in63

Id.

6Id.

Id. at 97,117-18.

See notes 108-09, 115 infra.
text accompanying notes 68-79 infra.
[1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,688, at 98,614 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 15,

67 See

1980).
" See [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]

FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,286, at 97,003 (S.D.
Ohio, filed Feb. 15, 1980) (Complaint, No. C-2-80-111). The Ohio Commissioner's complaint
averred that the SEC, by promulgating rule 14d-2(b), deliberately planned to preempt state
tender offer statutes and ignored less restrictive alternatives. Id. at 97,004. The Commissioner alleged that Congress did not give the SEC authority to promulgate a rule that effectively invalidates all state tender offer legislation. Id. Moreover, the Commissioner argued
that the rule contravenes Article VI, clause 2, and the 10th amendment to the Constitution.
Id. at 97,004-05; see note 16 supra.
The Ohio Commissioner sought a declaratory judgment that rule 14d-2(b) is invalid and
that Ohio's tender offer commencement statutes are not invalidated by rule 14d-2(b).
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,286, at 97,003. The SEC moved to
dismiss the action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 on the grounds that the
rule had not injured Ohio. [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,688, at
98,614.
71 Id. at 98,615-17. Ohio asserted two theories of standing that would permit the state
to pursue the claim against the S C. Ohio claimed a proprietary interest in Ohio's securities
market. Id. A proprietary interest involves nongovernmental functions performed by a
government for the best interests of its citizens. Id.; see Sarmiento v. Corpus Christi, Tex. Civ. App. -,
, 465 S.W.2d 813, 816 (Civ. App. 1971). Ohio also relied on the
parens patriae interest to gain standing to sue. The theory of parens patriae is used to protect quasi-sovereign interests such as the general economy of a state. [1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,688, at 98,615; see Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 54 (E.D.
Pa. 1973). The district court in Krouse held that Ohio's claim did not qualify as either a proprietary or a parens patriae interest. [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (OCH)
97,688, at 98,617. The court explained that a state may sue under a proprietary theory only
if the state's interest is analogous to that of the state's citizens. Id. at 98,615. Since Ohio's
complaint involved a purely regulatory interest, the court rejected the proprietary interest
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volving rule 14d-2(b), the Ohio Commissioner reasserted the invalidity of
rule 14d-2(b) as a defense to a suit by a private litigant."
In CanadianPacific Enterprises,Inc. v. Krouse,72 Canadian Pacific
brought suit in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio to resolve the timing conflict between rule 14d-2(b) and the Ohio
takeover statute." Canadian Pacific had announced a tender offer for all
the outstanding stock of Hobart Corporation.74 To comply with rule
14d-2(b), Canadian Pacific had to commence or withdraw its offer within
five days.75 Ohio law, however, required Canadian Pacific to wait twenty
days before commencing the offer. 71 Canadian Pacific consequently
sought a judgment declaring that rule 14d-2(b) preempts the state rule
and prayed for injunctive relief for complying with the state rule.7 Intervening as a defendant, Hobart joined Ohio's Commissioner in raising the
invalidity of rule 14d-2(b) as a defense. 78. The district court held that rule
14d-2(b) is a valid exercise of the SEC's rule-making authority and that
the rule preempts Ohio's takeover statute. 9
To determine the validity of rule 14d-2(b), the court in Canadian
Pacific adopted the standard for judicial review enumerated in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 0 Under the APA, a court may set
aside final agency action if the action exceeds the agency's statutory
authority or if the action is arbitrary and capricious." Measuring rule
14d-2(b)'s statutory authority, the court in CanadianPacific recognized
theory. Id. The court stated that under the parens patriae theory, the state's ability to sue
an agency of the federal government depends upon the extent of the state's interest and the
ability of private parties to obtain relief otherwise. See id (citing Pennsylvania v. KIeppe,
533 F.2d 688, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). Explaining that private parties in Ohio will have both the
motivation and the resources to litigate the issue of rule 14d-2's validity, the court considered the state's involvement unnecessary, rejected the parens patriae interest and
denied Ohio standing to sue. Id. at 98,617.
71 See Canadian Pac. Enter., Inc. v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Ohio 1981); text accompanying notes 73-79 infra.
72 506 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
" Id. at 1193.
"' Id. at 1194.
75 Id.; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1980).
11506 F. Supp. at 1194; see OHIo REV. CODE § 1707.04(b)(1) (1980).
7 560 F. Supp. at 1194.
78 Id.

9 Id. at 1197 & 1204; see text accompanying notes 80-96 infra.
506 F. Supp. at 1197-98; see 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976). The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides the appropriate guidelines of judicial review for statutes that do
not otherwise provide for or preclude review. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)-(2) (1976). Although
several sections of the '34 Act are subject to review under standards within the '34 Act, see,
e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78y(b), rule 14d-2(b) was adopted under sections that do not provide for
review. See text accompanying note 83 infra.
$ 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) & (C) (1976). In addition to voiding agency action that is beyond
statutory authority or that is arbitrary and capricious, courts may set aside agency action
that is contrary to a constitutional right, is unsupported by evidence, is unwarranted by the
facts, or lacks the proper procedure. See id. § 706(2)(B), 2(D)-(E) (1976).
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the breadth of the rule's enabling statutes." The SEC promulgated rule
14d-2(b) pursuant to sections 3(b), 14(d), 14(e), and 23(a) of the '34 Act. 3
Examining the rule's enabling statutes, the Canadian Pacific court
observed that section 3(b) empowers the SEC to define terms consistent
with the purposes of the '34 Act. 4 The court also sanctioned the SEC's
reliance on section 23(a), which confers upon the SEC general rulemaking powers to implement all of the Act's provisions. 5 The district
court in CanadianPacific explained that any rule promulgated under a
general rule-making provision will be sustained if the rule is reasonably
related to the purposes of the enabling statutes.88 In light of the protective purposes of the Williams Act, the CanadianPacific court concluded
that rule 14d-2(b) is reasonably related to the general rule-making provi7
sion of section 23(a) and is therefore valid.
In CanadianPacific the court next considered whether the SEC's
enactment of rule 14d-2(b) was arbitrary and capricious.88 The Supreme
Court has held that the scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious
standard is narrow 9 because courts are not empowered to substitute
82 506 F. Supp. 1199. The court in Canadian Pacific noted that administrative action
has a presumption of regularity. Id. at 1198 n.12 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971)); see notes 85 & 86 infra.
8 See 44 F. Reg. 9956 (1979). Sections 14(d) and 14(e) apply specifically to tender offers.
The court in CanadianPacific concluded that § 14(d)(4), which allows the SEC to make rules
regarding solicitation of tender offers, supports rule 14d-2 because it gives the SEC plenary
power to regulate the conduct of all who solicit acceptances of tender offers. 506 F. Supp. at
1199; see 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d}(4) (1976). The court also found that the tender offer fraud prohibitions of § 14(e) would support promulgation of rule 14d-2 in light of the potential for
manipulation if a tender offer was announced but not yet regulated by the Williams Act. 506
F.2d at 1200; see 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). See also notes 84 & 85 infra.
" See 506 F. Supp. at 1198; 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b) (1976). The Ohio Commissioner in Canadian Pacific argued that the SEC had exceed its authority in promulgating rule 14d-2
because the rule defines "commencement," a word that is not used in the '34 Act itself. 560
F. Supp. at 1199. The court found, however, that the definition interpreted § 14(d)(1), which
refers to the initial publication of a tender offer. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976).
1 560 F. Supp. at 1199. The Ohio Commissioner argued that § 23(a) could not support
the validity of rule 14d-2 because the rule is unnecessary and impermissibly preemptive of
state law. Id. The Commissioner also claimed that the SEC has no function that would
justify promulgation of the rule. Id. The court in CanadianPacific found that the preemptive nature of the rule has no bearing on the rule's validity. Id. The SEC's functions of investor protection and promotion of the public interest were broad enough, the court decided, to sanction a definitional rule. Id. The CanadianPacific court also took notice of the
Supreme Court's standard of judicial review for rules promulgated under a general rulemaking provision. Id.; see text accompanying note 87 infra.
560 F. Supp. at 1199; see Mourning v. Family Publ. Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369
(1973). The Court in Mourning ruled that if an administrative regulation furthers a
legitimate statutory purpose, the regulation is valid. Id. (quoting Thorpe v. Housing Auth.
of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969)). See also Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609
F.2d 570, 582 (2d Cir. 1979) (Morning test applied to securities rules).
', 560 F. Supp. 1199.
Id. at 1200.
Bowman Transp. Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86
(1974).
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their judgment for that of an administrative agency." In order for a rule
to be valid, the agency must have considered factors relevant to the
statutory purpose 9' and must have rationally related those factors to the
rule.2 The Canadian Pacific court concluded that the SEC had considered the appropriate factors necessary for a rule's validity because
the rule went through six years of study and revision prior to enactment. 3 Moreover, the court found a rational relationship between the
rule and the SEC's stated purpose to equalize protection of shareholders
and offerors.94 Reasoning that state takeover statutes impose delays on
tender offers that benefit target companies to the detriment of offerors,
the court found that rule 14d-2(b) prevents such delays and balances the
interests of shareholders and offerors. 95 Accordingly, the court in Canadian Pacific concluded that the SEC's promulgation of rule 14d-2(b) was
neither arbitrary and capricious, nor in excess of statutory authority
and, therefore, held that rule 14d-2(b) is valid and preempts Ohio's conflicting statute.
The court in CanadianPacific correctly held that rule 14d-2(b) is a
valid exercise of the SEC's rule-making authority. The rule not only conforms to the scope of the enabling statutes,97 but also promotes the aims
of the Williams Act. Congress conferred broad rule-making authority
on the SEC through section 23(a) of the '34 Act. 9 Moreover, as the Canadian Pacific court emphasized, rule 14d-2(b) preserves the balance between offerors and targets that the Ohio statute had tipped in favor of
targets.' Despite rule 14d-2(b)'s devastating preemptive effect on state
takeover statutes,' the rule should remain unassailable in light of the
SEC's broad rule-making authority 0 ' and the rational nexus between
the rule and the purpose of the Williams Act.0 3
Given the validity and preemptive impact of SEC rule 14d-2(b),
states should amend or otherwise interpret their advance disclosure and
pre-offer waiting period provisions to avoid invalidating conflicts with
SEC rule 14d-2(b). Several methods exist whereby states can reconcile

' Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
91 Id.
Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).
9 560 F. Supp. at 1201-02.
9' Id. at 1203.
" Id.; see Brief Amicus Curiae for SEC at 14, 57-58, Leroy v. Great W. United Corp.,
443 U.S. 173 (1979).
506 F. Supp. at 1203-04.
9' See text accompanying notes 83-88 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 93-97 supra.
'9 See text accompanying note 86 supra.
"® See text accompanying notes 76-77, 97 supra.
101 See text accompanying note 80 supra.
102 See text accompanying notes 85-87 supra.
" See text accompanying note 96 supra.
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their takeover statutes with rule 14d-2(b)."' The most obvious means of
reconciliation is the repeal by amendment of advance disclosure requirements altogether.1 15 Similarly, states can empower their public officials to waive all advance disclosure and pre-offer waiting period requirements." 8 Of course, authorizing state officers to waive unacceptable
state requirements will only prevent preemptive conflicts with rule
14d-2(b) where the applicable official actually exempts the transaction in
question. '
Short of totally eliminating advance disclosure requirements, states
can attempt to harmonize their takeover statutes with rule 14d-2(b) by
limiting the amount of information that a bidder must publicly disclose
in advance of the offer.' 8 SEC rule 14d-2(b) provides that a public announcement of a bidder's intent to make a tender offer in the future
which does not specify the amount of securities sought or the price offered does not commence a tender offer under rule 14d-2.19 A state
takeover statute, therefore, that permits the bidder to omit from required advance public disclosures either the quantity of shares sought or
104

See text accompanying notes 105-114 infra. The SEC has argued that states can har-

monize their takeover statutes with rule 14d-2(b) by interpreting the statutes to allow commencement pursuant to rule 14d-2(b), but to delay the bidder's actual purchase of the
shares. See Brief Amicus Curiae for SEC at 8, GM Sub. Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
reprinted in [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,389, at 97,542 (Del.
1980). Under this method, a bidder would commence an offer by disseminating tender offer
materials and receiving shares in a depository. Id. at 8 n.12. The actual purchase ("takedown") of the tendered shares would not occur until the end of a reasonable waiting period,
however. Id. See also SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-16623, supra note 20, at
15522.
," See N. Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1602 (McKinney Supp. 1980) (amended in 1980 to
eliminate 20-day disclosure requirements). New York law now mandates disclosure as soon
as practicable on the date the tender offer commences. Id.
' See MD. CORP. & ASS'NS. CODE ANN. § 11-902 (Supp. 1980) (amended in 1980 to give
Commissioner of Securities power to waive advance notice requirements); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 80B.07(3) (West Supp. 1980) (Commissioner can exempt tender offer from any statutory requirement).
,o,See Hi-Shear Indus. Inc. v. Neiditz [Current Matters Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,805, at 90,034 (D. Conn. 1980) (Connecticut takeover act preempted by SEC rule
14d-2(b) when Connecticut official refused to exempt tender offer).
'" Several states have responded to the adoption of SEC rule 14d-2(b) by interpreting
their takeover statutes to allow limited public disclosures that do not trigger rule 14d-2(d)'s
five-business-day commencement period. See, e.g, Georgia Commissioner of Securities
Release No. 3 (July 17, 1980), reprinted in Pozen & Lamb, Rule 14d-2(b) Under The
Securities Exchange Act And State Law Regulation of Takeover Bids, TWELFTH ANN. INST.
ON SEC. REG. 337, 339-43 (1980) (Georgia's takeover statute construed to allow omission of
tender offer price information from pre-offer disclosure); Maryland Securities Act Release
No. 22 (Apr. 18, 1980), reprintedin 1A BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 30,563, at 25,578 (state advance disclosure requirements interpreted as requiring only identities of bidder and target
and statement of intent to make offer); Wisconsin Administrative Rules SEC 21.01(6),
reprintedin 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 65,001, at 56,801 (bidder not required to disclose
either price offered or number of shares sought).
1- 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(d) (1980); see note 20 supra.
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the consideration offered will be compatible with rule 14d-2(b),"0 so long
as the information is not otherwise made public."' Similarly, states can
attempt to reconcile their takeover statutes with rule 14d-2(b) by replacing pre-offer public disclosure requirements with pre-offer non-public
disclosure requirements."' Rule 14d-2(b) only applies to public announcements or public statements that disclose the information specified in
SEC rule 14d-2(c)." 3 Thus, advance non-public disclosures to the
regulating state will not trigger commencement of the tender offer
4
under rule 14d-2(b)."
Although states can amend or re-interpret their takeover statutes to
void impermissible conflicts with SEC rule 14d-2(b), state tender offer
acts are subject to additional constitutional challenges based on preemp17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(c) (1980); see text accompanying note 20 supra.
See [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,731, at 98,835; note 49
supra. States that attempt to reconcile their respective takeover statutes with 14d-2(b) by
limiting the information which the bidder must disclose in pre-offer public announcements
may also have to limit the mandatory disclosures in tender offer registration statements filed with the state and the target. If a tender offer registration statement that contains the
information set out in SEC rule 14d-2(c) is a public document, the statement will initiate rule
14d-2(b)'s five day commencement requirement. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1980); SEC
Release No. 34-16623, supra note 20, at 15522. Similarly, disclosure of the information set
forth in SEC rule 14d-2(c) at pre-offer hearings may cause the tender offer to commence
under 14d-2(b) if the hearings are open to the public. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
Even if a state limits its advance disclosure requirements to the information set out in rule
14d-2(d), a preemptive conflict with rule 14d-2(b) may arise where a tender offer is subject to
regulation under more than one state takeover statute. Consider the following example.
Assume the X Co.'s tender offer for Y Co. is subject to takeover statutes in both state A
and state B. State A requires X Co. to announce publicly the material terms of the tender
offer 20 days in advance of the offer, but allows X Co. to omit the price to be offered from
the announcement. State A's takeover statute, therefore, appears to be compatible with
SEC rule 14d-2(b). See text accompanying notes 108-110 supra. State B requires X Co. to
disclose publicly the material terms of the tender offer 20 days before the offer begins, but
permits X Co. to omit from the announcement the number of shares sought. Standing alone,
state B's takeover statute is also consistent with SEC rule 14d-2(b). Id. Taken together,
however, the takeover statutes of state A and state B operate so as to conflict with rule
14d-2(b). X Corp's simultaneous compliance with the two otherwise valid takeover statutes
will result in the disclosure of all of the information set out in SEC rule 14d-2(c). This combined disclosure will trigger rule 14d-2(b)'s five-business-day commencement requirement
and, therefore, render unenforceable the respective 20 day waiting-period requirements of
both state statutes.
I2 In 1980, Idaho amended its takeover statute to require advance public disclosures
only when the state's Director of Securities so orders. See IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(1) (1980).
Although Idaho law no longer requires advance public disclosures, the state's takeover
statute still mandates advanced disclosure to the target company. Id. This disclosure to the
target company could cause commencement under 14d-2(b) if the target disclosed the information publicly. See note 49 supra.
11317 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(c) (1980).
'" A state takeover statute that requires advance public disclosures which bring about
III
"'

commencement under 14d-2(b) would nevertheless be compatible with rule 14d-2(b) if the
state's pre-offer, post-disclosure waiting period did not exceed five business days. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1980).

1981]

RULE 14d-2(b)

1039

tion and commerce clause rationales. In Great Western United Corp. v.
Kidwell,11 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held Idaho's takeover

statute "6 unconstitutional on both preemption.. 7 and commerce clause
grounds." 8 Although the Supreme Court reversed Kidwell in 1979 on
grounds of improper venue, "9 several 1980 and 1981 federal decisions
have adopted the Kidwell court's analysis and rejected the constitutionality of various state takeover statutes. 2 '
In MITE Corporationv. Dixon,"' The Seventh Circuit Court of Ap577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
" IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1513 (Supp. 1979).
,,?577 F.2d at 1274-81. In holding that the Williams Act preempted Idaho's takeover
statute, the Kidwell court stated that Congress adopted a market approach to tender offer
regulation. Id. at 1276-77. Under this market approach, investors are free to evaluate for
themselves the adequacy of tender offers. Id. The Kidwell court then reasoned that a
neutral regulatory scheme which gives both the target and the offeror an equal opportunity
to persuade the investor is essential to the operation of Congress' market approach. Id. at
1279-80. The Kidwell court found that Idaho's takeover statute disrupted this indispensable
neutrality by requiring advance disclosure of the offer, by giving the target the right to a
pre-offer hearing, and by favoring the target corporation in other ways. Id. The Kidwell
court concluded that since the Idaho statute stood as an impermissible obstacle to the accomplishment of the federal market approach to investor protection, the Idaho statute was
preempted. Id. at 1281.
"' Id. at 1281-86. In Kidwell, Idaho advanced several state interests in support of its
contention that the state takeover statute did not unduly burden interstate commerce. The
Kidwell court rejected Idaho's first asserted local interest, retention of state industry, as
impermissible state favoritism. Id. at 1282 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,
145 (1970)). The Kidwell court found Idaho's second alleged interest, encouragement of good
corporate citizenship, legitimate but of minimal weight. Id. at 1282-1286. Finally, the
Kidwell court accepted Idaho's asserted interest in shareholder protection, but discounted
the substantiality of the state interest by reasoning that the interest extended to resident
shareholders only. Id. at 1283, 1285. Since enforcement of the Idaho takeover statute halted
a 31 million dollar transaction in interstate commerce to protect only minimal state interests, the Kidwell court held the Idaho statute violative of the commerce clause. Id. at
1286.
...Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). By reversing Kidwell for improper venue, the Supreme Court avoided any discussion of the constitutionality of Idaho's
takeover statute. See id.
'" See, e.g., MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980) (Illinois takeover statute
invalidated); Hi-Shear Indus., Inc. v. Neiditz [Current Matters Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,805, at 90,034 (D. Conn. Dec. 16, 1980) (enforcement of Connecticut Tender Offer
Act enjoined); Hi-Shear Indus., Inc. v. Campbell, [Current Matters Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,804 at 90,027 (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 1980) (enforcement of South Carolina takeover
statute enjoined). Prior to 1980, the federal courts that considered the constitutionality of
state takeover statutes reached divergent results. Compare Great W. United Corp. v.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1286 (5th Cir. 1978) (Idaho statute invalidated); and Dart Indus., Inc.
v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 13-14 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (Delaware takeover statute held unconstitutional) with AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929, 941 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (Ohio
takeover statute held constitutional); and City Inv. Co. v. Simcox, 476 F. Supp. 112, 116 (S.D.
Ind. 1979), affd on othergrounds, 633 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1980) (Indiana takeover act held constitutional).
,2,633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), appeal filed sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 49
U.S.L.W. 3533 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1981) (No. 80-1188).
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peals used the rationales set forth in Kidwell to hold the Illinois
Business Takeover Act"' unconstitutional on preemption and commerce
clause grounds.' In MITE, the plaintiff sought to gain control of a
publicly held Illinois corporation, Chicago Rivet & Machine Co. (Chicago
Rivet), by making a cash tender offer for all of the outstanding shares of
Chicago Rivet common stock." 4 In connection with the tender offer for
Chicago Rivet, MITE brought suit in the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois seeking a declaratory judgment that the Illinois takeover act was unconstitutional and a permanent injunction
against enforcement of the state act. 1" 5 The Illinois takeover statute
authorized Illinois' Secretary of State to determine whether MITE's
tender solicitation was substantively fair and to prohibit the offer if the
offer appeared inequitable." 6 Additionally, the Illinois takeover act required MITE to disclose certain information in advance of the offer" and
indirectly permitted Chicago Rivet to request a mandatory pre-offer
hearing on whether MITE's offer could commence." 8 The district court
entered a final order permanently enjoining enforcement of the Illinois
act against MITE's offer on the grounds that the state statute violated
the commerce clause and was preempted by the Williams Act."
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit initially addressed the issue of
whether the Williams Act preempted Illinois' takeover act."' The MITE
court acknowledged that while the Williams Act does not expressly or
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2 § 137.51 to .70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980).
633 F.2d at 498-99, 502; see notes 117 & 118 supra.
124 633 F.2d at 488.
125 Id.
122
12

'u ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2 § 137.57E (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980). The Illinois takeover
statute granted jurisdiction over tender offers for any corporation that met two out of three
specified conditions. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2 § 137.52-10 (1979)). The first
specified condition was that the target company have its principal place of business in Illinois. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2 § 137.52-10(a) (1979). The second requirement was that the
target be an Illinois corporation. Id. at § 137.52-10(b). The third condition was that the
target have at least 10% of its stated capital and paid in surplus represented in Illinois. Id.
at § 137.52-10(c).
..ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2 § 137.54A, B, E (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980). The Illinois
takeover statute required tender offerors to file registration statements with the state and
the target company at least twenty business days before commencing the solicitation of
shares. Id. Under the Illinois, act, tender offerors also have to disclose publicly the material
terms of the offer contemporaneously with the filing of the registration statements. Id.
'8 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2 §137.57A (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980). Section 137.57A provided that a majority of the target's outside directors or any Illinois shareholder or group of
shareholders owning at least 10% of any class of the target's equity securities could call a
mandatory hearing within fifteen business days of the bidder's pre-offer filing. Id.; see note
127 supra. Illinois' Secretary of State also had the discretion to call a pre-offer hearing. ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2 § 135.57A (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980).
"2 633 F.2d at 490; see MITE Corp. v. Dixon, No. 79-C-200 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 1979), affd,
633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980).
" 633 F.2d at 490-98.
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implicitly bar state regulation of tender offers,"' the Act, as federal law,
does preempt any state takeover statute which interferes with Congress' investor protection purpose.'32 The court in MITE then observed
that Congress enacted the Williams Act to protect investors through a
market approach.'33 This market approach enables both the offeror and
the target's management to present fully their proposals to the target's
shareholders and then allows these investors to evaluate the tender offer individually. 3 4 The MITE court reasoned that Illinois' paternalistic
approach to shareholder protection conflicted with the federal market
approach by depriving target shareholders of the unfettered decisionmaking ability which the Williams Act contemplates. 1"' The MITE court
concluded, therefore, that the Williams Act preempted the Illinois

"' 633 F.2d at 491; see note 16 supra. In enacting the '34 Act, Congress did not expressly prohibit state regulation of tender offers. 633 F.2d at 491; see Langevoort, State Tender
Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213,
247-48 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Langevoort]; Note, Securities Law and the Constitution:
State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered,88 YALE L.J. 510, 519 [hereinafter cited as State
Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered]. Furthermore, congressional regulation of tender offers is neither so pervasive nor of such paramount federal importance that preemption is
implicit. 633 F.2d at 491; Note, Statutory Comments: Take-Over Bids in Virginia, 26 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 323, 334 (1969). But see Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 12 (S.D.
Ind. 1978) (Williams Act and rules promulgated thereunder held to constitute pervasive
scheme of federal regulation preempting state takeover statutes); Tiger, supra note 12, at
472-74. Section 28(a) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976 & Supp. 1979), indicates congressional acceptance of concurrent federal and state securities regulation. 633 F.2d at 491
(citing Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 433 U.S. 173, 182 (1979)). Nevertheless, § 28(a)
neither directly nor indirectly legitimizes the coexistence of the Williams Act and state
takeover statutes. Congress enacted § 28(a) to preserve state blue sky laws, the purpose of
which is different from state tender offer acts. See 577 F.2d at 1281; Langevoort, supra, at
247. Additionally, § 28(a) does not evidence congressional intent to sustain state takeover
statutes because Congress enacted § 28 long before states enacted tender offer legislation.
See Langevoort, supra,at 247; Tiger, supra note 12, at 466.
,32633 F.2d at 492 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 (1944)). Preemption of
state statutes by conflict with federal law occurs if the application of a particular state
statute obstructs the accomplishment of the purposes and policies that a federal statute
serves. Id. at 491; see Florida Lime & Avocodo Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141
(1963); note 12 supra.
633 F.2d at 492 (citing Kidwell).
"' Id.; see note 15 s5upra. The reason for the adoption of a market approach to investor
protection was the congressional recognition that tender offers benefit shareholders and
that prevention of tender offers could harm shareholders. 577 F.2d at 1277; see H.R. REP.
No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2813
(Williams Act designed to make relevant facts known to shareholder so that shareholder
has fair opportunity to decide).
11 633 F.2d at 494 (citing Kidwell); see text accompanying note 126 supra. Unlike Illinois' takeover statute, the Idaho act at issue in Kidwell did not authorize state officials to
judge the fairness of tender offers. See IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1513 (Supp. 1979). The Illinois statute challenged in MITE, therefore, imposed more stringent requirements on tender
offerors than did the Idaho statute that the Fifth Circuit invalidated in Kidwell.

1042

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVIII

takeover statute to the extent that Illinois substituted the judgment of
its Secretary of State for the judgment of fully informed investors.136
The MITE court also rejected on preemption grounds Illinois' advance disclosure requirement and pre-offer hearing provision. 7 With
respect to the hearing provision, the MITE court recognized that mandatory pre-offer hearings obstruct the congressional goal of insuring investor decision-making autonomy because hearings afford the target a
method of indefinitely surpressing takeovers. 138 The MITE court further
found that pre-offer hearings as well as advance disclosure requirements
unduly delay tender solicitations to the detriment of investors.' 9 The
MITE court reasoned that delay potentially injures investors by giving
the target's management time to take defensive measures that may
deprive shareholders of an opportunity to tender their shares at a
premium."' By delaying tender offers, Illinois' takeover statute
disrupted the regulatory neutrality between bidders and targets that
Congress considered essential to its goal of investor protection."' Thus,
the MITE court held Illinois' advance disclosure and pre-offer hearing
provisions unconstitutional."'
In determining the constitutionality of the Illinois takeover statute
under the commerce clause, the MITE court balanced Illinois' state interest in regulating MITE's tender offer against the resultant burden on
interstate commerce."3 In MITE, Illinois Secretary of State Dixon
asserted two local interests in support of the state's regulation of tender
solicitations. First, Dixon maintained that the Illinois takeover statute
advanced a legitimate state interest in protecting resident investors."'
'" 633 F.2d at 494. The MITE court noted that even the SEC did not seek authority to
evaluate the substantive equity of a tender solicitation. Id. at 494 n.14. Congress' failure to
adopt tender offer provisions that require substantive fairness, however, is consistent with
the general scheme of the federal securities laws which regulate through disclosure rather
than by requiring fiduciary duties of fairness. Cf. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 478-79 (1977) (unfairness and equitable fraud not actionable under § 10(b) of '34 Act and
SEC rule 10b-5).
, See text accompanying notes 127 & 128 supra.
'38 633 F.2d at 494-95. The MITE court noted that a state takeover statute which merely allows optional pre-offer hearings upon requests could be constitutional in some cases. Id.
at 495 n.18.
633 F.2d at 495-98.
Id. at 497 (citing Kidwell).
"
Id. at 496; see H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1968] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2813 (balance between offerors and target necessary for investor protection). The MITE court observed that a shift in the regulatory balance between
bidders and targets would deny shareholders their right to tender their shares at a
premium price. 633 F.2d at 496.
"' Id. at 498. The MITE court noted that the Illinois Act was in direct conflict with
SEC rule 14d-2(b). Id. at 499 n.25; see text accompanying notes 26-30 infra. The MITE court,
however, did not base its finding of preemption on SEC rule 14d-2(b) because the rule did
not apply retroactively to the tender offer in question. 633 F.2d at 499 n.25.
"
633 F.2d at 500; see note 17 supra.
633 F.2d at 500.

19811

RULE 14d-2(b)

1043

Second, Dixon argued that tender offers are analogous to internal shifts
of corporate control which Illinois had a valid local interest in regulating
as intracorporate matters.14 Responding to Dixon's first argument, the
MITE court acknowledged that shareholder protection was a legitimate
state concern, but observed that Illinois' takeover act afforded only
questionable benefits to local investors.'4 6 The MITE court further
reasoned that Illinois' concern for protecting participants in securities
transactions extended only to resident shareholders. 1 and, therefore,
did not justify the significant extra-territorial impact of the state's
takeover statute.148 The MITE court then rejected Illinois' second alleged local interest by reasoning that, even if a tender offer is an intracorporate matter," Illinois had shown no interest in regulating the offer in
1
question. 50

Having discounted Illinois' asserted state interests in tender offer
regulation, the MITE court examined the state takeover statute's
burden on interstate commerce. The MITE court initially observed that

the Illinois statute's most obvious effect on interstate commerce was the
potential to halt securities transactions executed outside of Illinois. 5 '
The MITE court then reasoned that enforcement of the Illinois act
against MITE would have delayed and possibly prevented a transaction
in interstate commerce of over twenty-three million dollars. 5 ' Since Illinois lacked a state interest that justified the burdensome impact of the

state's takeover statute on interstate commerce, the MITE court held
the Illinois act unconstitutional under the commerce clause."
Citing Kidwell and MITE, the South Carolina Federal District Court
in Hi-Shear Industries, Inc. v. Campbell,54 enjoined enforcement of
South Carolina's Takeover Act 155 on both preemption and commerce
Id. at 501.
Id. at 500; see text accompanying note 140 supra.
"T 633 F.2d at 500.
" Id. at 501. The MITE court recognized that the jurisdictional provision of the Illinois
takeover act enabled Illinois to regulate tender offers that did not affect a single Illinois
shareholder. 633 F.2d at 501; see note 126 supra.
14 633 F.2d at 501. The MITE court noted that the Fifth Circuit in Kidwell had concluded that a tender offer does not fall within the intracorporate affairs doctrine. Id. at 501
n.28; see 577 F.2d at 1280 n.53; text accompanying notes 212-218 infra.
1" 633 F.2d at 501. The court stated that, assuming tender offers are analogous to
intracorporate control shifts, a state must still show some interest in regulating the offer in
question. See id. In MITE, Illinois did not advance a sufficient reason, such as an intent by
the bidder to loot the target, for regulating MITE's tender offer. 633 F.2d at 501.
.' Id. at 502.
"

"'

152Id.

'" Id. After holding the Illinois act unconstitutional, the MITE court observed that not
all state tender offer legislation which goes beyond the Williams Act is unconstitutional. Id.
at 502-03. The MITE court, expressly left open the possibility that a state could draft a valid
takeover statute which would compliment, rather than contradict, the Williams Act. Id.
"' [Current Matters Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,804, at 90,027 (D.S.C. 1980).
"= S.C. CODE §§ 35-2-10 to -100 (Supp. 1979).
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clause grounds.15 The South Carolina takeover statute empowered
South Carolina's Securities Commissioner to subject tender offers to
pre-offer fairness hearings and to prohibit a tender offer if the offer appeared unfair. 1' In Campbell, Hi-Shear Industries, Inc. (Hi-Shear), a
Delaware corporation, commenced a tender offer for RaybestosManhattan, Inc. (Raybestos), a Connecticut firm.158 Reacting to
Hi-Shear's tender offer, Raybestos filed suit in a South Carolina state
court alleging that the offer violated South Carolina's recently adopted
takeover statute.'59 Hi-Shear removed the state court action to the South
Carolina Federal District Court and moved to enjoin enforcement of the
South Carolina act on preemption and commerce clause grounds. 8 '
Presuming that South Carolina's Securities Commissioner would interpret and apply the new South Carolina takeover act constitutionally, the
Campbell court initially denied Hi-Shear's request for preliminary injunctive relief.'' Hi-Shear renewed its request for an injunction,
however, when South Carolina's Securities Commissioner refused to exempt the Hi-Shear offer from the South Carolina act and scheduled a
hearing to determine the fairness of the offer.'62
In granting Hi-Shear's second request for an injunction, the Campbell court held that South Carolina's takeover statute as applied to HiShear's tender offer violated the supremacy and commerce clauses of
the United States Constitution.'63 With respect to the supremacy clause
argument, the Campbell court reasoned that the South Carolina
takeover statute obstructed the objectives of the Williams Act by
authorizing a public official to evaluate the substantive fairness of
tender offers.6 4 The Campbell court rejected this patently paternalistic
" [Current Matters Binder]

FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

97,804, at 90,034.

,..S.C. CODE § 35-2-60(3), (4) (Supp. 1979).
[Current Matters Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,804, at 90,028.
,5 Id. The South Carolina state court granted Raybestos' request for a temporary injunction against Hi-Shear. Id. The Federal District Court for the District of South Carolina,
however, subsequently dissolved the state court injunction. Id. at 90,028-29.
160Id. at 90,028.
161 Id. at 90,029. Under the abstention doctrine set forth in Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), federal courts should refrain from deciding the constitutionality of unsettled or ambiguous state laws until state courts or officials have had an opportunity to interpret or apply the laws in question. Id. at 427-28; see Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360, 376-77 (1976) (Pullman abstention triggered when applicability of challenged state
law to certain party or defined course of conduct is unsettled); Harmon v. Forssenius, 380
U.S. 528, 534 (1965) (federal courts should avoid tentative decisions on state law questions
and premature constitutional adjudication).
,62[Current Matters Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,804, at 90,029.
16 Id. at 90,030.
Id. at 90,031; see text accompanying note 157 supra. The South Carolina provision
that empowered the state's Securities Commissioner to prohibit tender offers as substantively inequitable was essentially identical to the Illinois provision which the Seventh Circuit rejected in MITE. Compare S.C. CODE. § 35-2-60(4) (Supp. 1979) with ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
121 1/2 137.57E (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).

19811

RULE 14d-2b)1

1045

method of shareholder protection as contrary to congressional intent
under the Williams Act that investors be free to make their own investment decisions regarding a tender offer." 5 The Campbell court also
found impermissible conflict in the differing time requirements of the
respective federal and state substantive provisions that governed
withdrawal rights,66 and pro-rata purchase rights of tendering shareholders."' 7 Moreover, the Campbell court stated that South Carolina's
pre-offer hearing provision caused delays which disrupted the
regulatory neutrality that Congress considered essential to investor protection. 6 ' The Campbell court concluded, therefore, that the Williams
Act preempted South Carolina's takeover statute.'69
Turning to the constitutionality of the South Carolina takeover act
under the commerce clause, the Campbell court balanced South
Carolina's asserted interests in regulating the tender offer against the
resultant burden on interstate commerce. South Carolina argued that
its takeover statute furthered legitimate state concerns by safeguarding
shareholders and by regulating internal corporate affairs. 7' The Campbell court discounted the weight of South Carolina's interest in
shareholder protection by reasoning that only two percent of the
'" [Current Matters Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,804, at 90,031 (citing MITE
and Kidwell).
' Id. at 90,031. Regulations under the Williams Act provide a shareholder the right to
withdraw tender shares within fifteen business days and after sixty days from the start of
an offer. See note 5 supra. The South Carolina takeover statute, however, allowed
withdrawal within twenty days and after thirty days from the commencement of an olfer.
S.C. CODE § 35-2-70(3) (Supp. 1979). The Campbell court concluded that the two statutes conflicted because the South Carolina statute permitted investors to withdraw tendered shares
at times when the Williams Act did not provide for withdrawal. [Current Matters Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,804, at 90,031 (citing Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp.
1, 12-13 (S.D. Ind. 1978)).
11T [Current Matters Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,804, at 90,031. Under the
Williams Act, an offeror must purchase pro-rata all of the shares, that investors tender during the first ten days of the offer if the total number of shares tendered during the initial
ten days exceeds the number sought. See note 6 supra. Unlike the Williams Act, the South
Carolina takeover statute required pro-rata acceptance of all deposited shares regardless of
when investors tendered the shares. S.C. CODE. § 35-2-70(4) (1979 Supp.). The Campbell
court found that requiring tender offerors to comply with both of these requirements was
impossible and contrary to the purpose of the Williams Act. [Current Matters Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,804, at 90,031.
" Id. at 90,031-32 (citing Kidwell and MITE). Although the South Carolina takeover
act authorized the state securities Commissioner to convene a pre-offer fairness hearing on
proposed tender offers, the state act did not permit target companies to demand pre-offer
hearings. S.C. CODE § 35-2-60(3) (Supp. 1979). In contrast, the state takeover statutes invalidated in MITE and Kidwell provided target companies with the right to call, directly or indirectly, pre-offer fairness hearings. See 633 F.2d at 494-95 (ILL. REV. STAT ch. 121 112 §
137.57A (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980) construed); 577 F.2d at 1278 (IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(4)
(Supp. 1979) construed).
" [Current Matters Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,804, at 90,032.
17oId. at 90,032-34.
"7

Id. at 90.032.
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Raybestos shareholders who the state act purportedly protected were
South Carolina residents."' The Campbell court also reasoned that state
takeover statutes like South Carolina's are of questionable benefit to
shareholders and possibly only protect the incumbent management of
target companies.'
In considering South Carolina's alleged interest in regulating the HiShear tender offer as an intracorporate matter, the Campbell court initially observed that a state's interest in regulating the internal affairs of
domestic corporations is traditionally recognized." 4 Nevertheless,
because Raybestos was a foreign corporation with its principal place of
business in Connecticut, the Campbell court rejected South Carolina's
contention that Hi-Shear's tender offer for Raybestos was an intracorporate matter amenable to South Carolina regulation.1 In contrast to
South Carolina's minimal interest in regulating the Hi-Shear tender offer, the Campbell court found that the South Carolina statute imposed a
major burden on interstate commerce.' Local action under the South
Carolina takeover statute against Hi-Shear's offer would have delayed
and potentially halted a thirty million dollar transaction in interstate
commerce. 7 The court in Campbell concluded, therefore, that the South
Carolina takeover act impermissibly obstructed interstate commerce in
violation of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. 8
17 Id. The Campbell court found suspect South Carolina's alleged interest in protecting
resident shareholders since the jurisdictional criteria for invoking the state's takeover act
did not relate to the residence of the target's shareholders. Id. at 90,033; see S.C. CODE §
35-2-20(5) (Supp. 1979). Similarly, the Illinois statute rejected in MITE and the Idaho statute
rejected in Kidwell granted potential jurisdiction over tender offers without regard to the
residence of the target's shareholders. 633 F.2d at 501; 577 F.2d at 1283.
171 [Current Matters Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,804, at 90,032 (citing MITE).
Id. at 90,033.
The Campbell court suggested in dicta that South Carolina had a legitimate state interest in preventing locally managed corporations from being taken over by foreign corporations. [Current Matters Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,804, at 90,033. The Campbell court observed, however, that this interest was nonexistent in the instant case because
both the offeror and the target were foreign corporations with out-of-state managements.
Id. In contrast to the Campbellcourt, the Kidwell circuit court expressly stated that protection of incumbent management against takeovers by out-of-state bidders was an impermissible state interest. 577 F.2d at 1282; see note 118 supra.
[Current Matters Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,804, at 90,033.
'T Id. In addition to interfering with a thirty million dollar transaction in interstate
commerce, the concurrent jurisdiction of Connecticut's takeover statute over the Raybestos
tender offer increased the South Carolina statute's potential to disrupt interstate commerce. Id.; see note 178 infra.
"I [Current Matters Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,804, at 90,033. The Hi-Shear
tender offer at issue in Campbell also prompted litigation over the constitutionality of Connecticut's takeover statute. In Hi-Shear Indus. Inc. v. Neiditz, [Current Matters Binder]
FED. Sc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,805, at 90,035 (D. Conn. 1980), Hi-Shear brought suit seeking to
enjoin enforcement of Connecticut's takeover statute on preemption and commerce clause
grounds. Id.; see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-456 to -469 (West Supp. 1980). In evaluating
Hi-Shear's request for a preliminary injunction, the Neiditz court found potential conflict
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Relying on the commerce clause and preemption rationales set forth
in Campbell, Kidwell and MITE, the New Jersey District Court in Kennecott Corp. v. Smith'.9 recently rejected New Jersey's takeover act.'8 °
In holding that the Williams Act preempted the New Jersey statute,'8'
the Kennecott court first recognized that the purpose of the Williams
Act was to protect investors by insuring that investors promptly receive
adequate information with which to evaluate a tender offer.' 8' The Kennecott court also reasoned that Congress provided for regulatory
neutrality between bidders and targets under the Williams Act to
preserve for investors the opportunity to receive tender offers.' 8' The
Kennecott court then found that New Jersey's statute, through delay,
obstructed the investor protection purpose of the Williams Act by
depriving shareholders of essential investment information and decisionmaking autonomy.' The court further held that the delay which the
between the Williams Act and Connecticut's advance disclosure and pre-offer hearing provisions. [Current Matters Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,805, at 90,036-37. The Neiditz
court further noted that the Connecticut statute might place unacceptable burdens on interstate commerce. Id. at 90,037 n.3; see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-457(h)(9) (West Supp. 1980)
(Securities Commissioner allowed to exempt tender offers from state act). The Neiditz
court, therefore, denied Hi-Shear's initial request for preliminary injunctive relief by applying the doctrine of judicial abstention. [Current Matters Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,805, at 90,037-38; see note 161 supra. After Connecticut's Securities Commissioner refused to exempt the Hi-Shear tender offer from the requirements of the Connecticut takeover
act, however, the Neiditz court barred enforcement of the state act on preemption and commerce clause grounds. [Current Matters Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,805, at 90,038
(Order of December 16, 1980).
7 [Current Matters Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,858, at 90,298 (D.N.J. 1981).
., Id. at 90,306, 90,312; see N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:5-1 to -19 (West Supp. 1980). The
district court's opinion in Kennecott involved the same tender offer at issue in Smith. See
text accompanying notes 33-51 supra. In Smith, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held in
the limited context of a motion for a preliminary injunction that SEC rule 14d-2(b) preempted certain provisions of New Jersey's takeover statute which delayed commencement of
Kennecott's tender offer for Curtiss-Wright. [1980-81 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,731, at 98,383; see text accompanying notes 41-46 supra. On remand from the
Smith decision, the District Court of New Jersey issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of New Jersey's takeover statute. [Current Matters Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,858, at 90,310. Subsequently, the Kennecott court held New Jersey's takeover
statute invalid and granted Kennecott's original request for a declaratory judgment and a
preliminary injunction. Id. at 90,299.
,81The Kennecott court recognized that Congress in enacting the Williams Act had not
expressly barred the states from regulating tender offers. Id., at 90,305. The court in Kennecott further observed that a congressional intent to preempt state takeover statutes was
not implicit in the Williams Act. Id. The Kennecott court concluded, therefore, that the only
issue before the court was whether New Jersey's takeover statute obstructed the accomplishment of the purposes of the Williams Act. Id.; see notes 131 & 132 supra.
,1 [Current Matters Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,858, at 90,305-06 (citing
Smith, Kidwell, and MITE).
Id. at 90,306 (citing Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975)).
Id. at 90,306. Stating that Congress had already determined that delay-causing advance disclosure requirements injured investors, the Kennecott court held that pre-offer
delay violates the Williams Act's investor protection purpose. Id. (citing Smith and MITE).
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New Jersey takeover act engendered discouraged tender offers to the
detriment of shareholders by enhancing the ability of targets to defeat
offers.'85 The Kennecott court concluded, therefore, that the Williams
Act preempted New Jersey's takeover statute.'86
Addressing the constitutionality of the state takeover statute under
the commerce clause, the Kennecott court initially observed that the
state statute unquestionably burdened interstate commerce.'87 The Kennecott court explained that a local statute which has only an incidental
adverse effect on interstate commerce can be valid under the commerce
clause.'88 The Kennecott court found, however, that New Jersey's
takeover statute was neither local in purpose nor incidental in its effect
on interstate commerce.'89 Therefore, the Kennecott court rejected the
New Jersey statute without balancing the state's alleged local interests
against the resultant burden on interstate commerce. 9' Moreover, the
Kennecott court held that even if the New Jersey statute was a local
measure with only incidental adverse effects on interstate commerce,
the statute's interference with interstate commerce clearly outweighed
any local benefits which the statute furthered."'

"I[Current Matters Binder]

FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,858, at 90,306.
186Id. at 90,310. The specific New Jersey provisions that the Kennecott court rejected

as causing unacceptable delay and usurping shareholder decision-making power provided
for a pre-commencement waiting period, a pre-offer fairness hearing, burdensome disclosure
requirements, and additional discretionary administrative restraints. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §
49:5-3(a) (Supp. 1980) (waiting period); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-4(a) (Supp. 1980) (hearing provision); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:5-12(a), -17 (Supp. 1980). The Kennecott court also found that
SEC rule 14d-2(b) preempted various New Jersey provisions. [Current Matters Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,858, at 90,309-10; see text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
187[Current Matters Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,858, at 90,310-311. In Kennecott, New Jersey conceded that Kennecott's tender offer was a transaction in interstate
commerce and that the state's takeover statute restrained interstate commerce. Id. at
90,310. Enforcement of New Jersey's takeover statute would have delayed and possibly prohibited a $160 million dollar nationwide securities transaction. Id. at 90,310.
'8 [Current Matters Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,858, at 90,311; see note 17
supra.
,89[Current Matters Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,858, at 90,311. In finding that
the New Jersey takeover statute was not merely a local regulation with incidental effects
on interstate commerce, the Kennecott court reasoned that the statute undertook to
safeguard investors nationwide. Id. Moreover, the Kennecott court observed that a major
characteristic of proper "local" regulatory purposes was the control of regional problems
and circumstances that are too diverse and numerous for adequate federal regulation. Id.
(citing Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945)). State tender offer statutes
lack this characteristic, however, since the federal government already regulates tender offers under the Williams Act. Id.
190Id. In rejecting New Jersey's takeover statute under the commerce clause, the Kennecott court's refusal to balance local benefits against interstate burdens goes beyond
earlier cases in the Kidwell line. The earlier cases in the Kidwell line all found that states
had a valid local interest in regulating tender offers. See MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at
500-01; Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1282-86.
1"1[Current Matters Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,858, at 90,311. The Kennecott
court reasoned that although New Jersey might have had a legitimate interest in protecting
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Taken together, Kidwel4 MITE, Campbel and Kennecott provide
tender offerors with a strong basis for challenging state takeover
statutes under the commerce clause.192 An even-handed state statute
that furthers a legitimate local public interest with only incidental effects on interstate commerce is valid unless the resultant burden on interstate commerce exceeds the putative local benefits.193 State takeover
statutes, however, are clearly not local statutes with only incidental effects on interstate commerce. Rather, state takeover statutes govern
securities transactions with nationwide impact."' Since the jurisdictional
provisions of most takeover statutes 95 permits states to regulate tender
offer transactions executed outside the regulating state, state tender ofresident investors, the state had no interest in prohibiting Kennecott's solicitation of shares
outside of the state. Id. (citing MITE and Kidwell). Since the New Jersey statute forbid the
solicitation of Curtiss-Wright shares worldwide, the statute's extraterritorial effect was excessive in relation to the state's purported interest in shareholder protection. Id. Moreover,
the Kennecott court reasoned that the takeover statute through delay harmed rather than
safeguarded investors. Id. (citing MITE and Kidwell).
112 See text accompanying notes 202-217 infra. See also Crane Co. v. Lam [Current Matters Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,986, at 90,535-38 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (enjoining enforcement of Pennsylvania Takeover Act). Commerce clause and preemption challenges to state
tender offer statutes based on the rationales set forth in Kidwell were not totally successful
in 1980. See, e.g., Wylain, Inc. v. TRE Corp., 412 A.2d 338 (Del. Ch. 1980) (commerce clause
and preemption challenges to Delaware takeover statute rejected); Strode v. Esmark
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,538, at 97,801 (Cir. Ct. Ky. 1980)
(Kentucky takeover statute upheld against supremacy and commerce clause challenges). In
Telvest v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029 (4th Cir. 1980), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed a district court's grant of preliminary injunctive relief that had barred enforcement of the Virginia takeover statute against open market purchases. Id. at 1036. The
district court had enjoined enforcement of Virginia's statute on commerce clause and
preemption grounds. Telvest v. Bradshaw [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,154, at 96,366 (E.D. Va. 1980). In reversing the district court, the Fourth Circuit
held merely that the district court failed to adhere to the appropriate standards for issuance
of a preliminary injunction. 618 F.2d at 1033-34, 1036. Thus, due to Telvest's procedural
posture, the decision neither supports nor contradicts the commerce clause and preemption
challenges set forth in the Kidwell line of cases. See generally McCauliff, Federalism and
the Constitutionalityof State Takeover Statutes, 67 VA. L. REV. 295 (1981).
See note 17 supra.
[Current Matters Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,858, at 90,311; see text accompanying notes 188 & 189 supra.
"I Almost all state takeover statutes regulate tender offers for domestic corporations
or corporations with their principal place of business located in the regulating state. Tiger,
supra note 12, at 460; State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, supra note 131, at 525-56;
see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(2) (Supp. 1980) (tender offers for companies incorporated in Delaware regulated); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1601(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980) (offers for companies incorporated in, or with principal place of business and substantial assets
in New York regulated); VA. CODE § 13.1-529(e) (Supp. 1980) (tender offers for corporations
chartered and doing business in Virginia regulated). Other statutes also grant jurisdiction
over tender offers to companies having a certain number of shareholders, employees, or
assets in the regulating state. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2 § 137.52-10 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1980) (tender offer to corporation having over 10% of its shareholders in Illinois
regulated).
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fer statutes have a substantial and intentional impact on interstate com198
merce.
Even if state takeover statutes are local measures with only incidental effects on interstate commerce, the detrimental impact of the
statutes on interstate commerce outweighs any associated local benefits.
The effect of state takeover statutes on interstate commerce is unquestionably burdensome. State takeover statutes discourage, delay, and
often prohibit large-scale securities transactions.'97 State tender offer
laws also disrupt the efficient functioning of national securities
markets.'9 8 Moreover, the differing jurisdictional requirements under
various state takeover statutes could subject a tender offer to multiple
inconsistent burdens.199
Commentators have suggested that two legitimate local interests
justify the burdensome impact of state takeover statutes on interstate
The first asserted state interest, investor protection, is
commerce.'
legitimate to the extent that the state takeover statute in question pro'" See Tiger, supra note 12, at 481; State Tender Offers Statutes Reconsidered,supra
note 131, at 527. The extra-territorial reach of state takeover statutes differentiates state
takeover statutes from state blue sky laws. The Supreme Court has upheld various state
blue sky laws against commerce clause challenges because the laws in question only applied
to "intrastate" transactions. See, e.g., Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 552 (1917).
9 [1980] FED. SEC. L. REP. (OCH) 97,731, at 98,836-37; 633 F.2d at 495-98; 577 F.2d at
1283; Fischel, supra note 12, at 27-28; Langevoort, supra note 131, at 238; Wilner & Landy,
The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM. L.
REV. 1, 19-21 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Wilner & Landy]. Even ardent supporters of the
constitutionality of state takeover statutes admit that state tender offer regulations
substantially burden interstate commerce. See, e.g., State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, supra note 131, at 525-26.
"I'State tender offer statutes threaten the efficiency of the market for corporate control by enhancing the ability of inefficient target companies to resist tender offers by more
competent bidders. See Fischel, supra note 12, at 27-28. Additionally, state takeover
statutes impair the indispensible services of arbitrageurs. Langevoort, supra note 131, at
239. Arbitrageurs purchase shares at a price between the current market price and the
tender offer price, thereby enabling investors to dispose of their shares without the risk of
nonacceptance inherent in a tender offer. ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 12, at 173-74.
Arbitrageurs, therefore, provide an essential element of liquidity to securities markets. Id.
A state tender offer act that limits the probability of an offer's success, however, will
discourage arbitrage. See Langevoort, supra note 131, at 239.
I" Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1284-85; see Tiger, supra note 12, at
482; A Response to Great Western, supra note 12, at 926. If several states impose inconsistent time requirements and substantive regulations on a single tender offer, the resulting
burden could violate the commerce clause. See Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434
U.S. 429 (1978) (inconsistent state regulations concerning truck trailer length unacceptably
burden interstate commerce); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (inconsistent state regulations concerning truck mud-guards impermissibly burden interstate
commerce); Boehm, State Interests and Interstate Commerce: A Look At The Theoretical
Underpinnings of Takeover Legislation, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733, 754 [hereinafter cited
as Boehm]. See also note 111 supra (inconsistent state requirements may cause preemption
under 14d-2(b)).
I See text accompanying notes 201 & 202 infra.
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tects resident shareholders and governs intrastate transactions."' A
state's local interest in protecting resident shareholders, however, does
not justify state regulation of non-residents involved in securities transactions outside of the regulating state."2 The propriety of the second
asserted local interest, the regulation of intracorporate affairs, depends
upon whether the characterization of a tender offer as an internal corporate matter is valid. ' A traditional feature of state corporate law, in
contrast to state securities law, is its extraterritorial reach." 4 Classifying a tender offer as an intracorporate matter, therefore, could potentially justify the global impact of most state takeover statutes.'
Although the MITE and Campbell courts did not expressly reject or accept the attempted classification of a tender offer as an intracorporate
affair, ' the analogy is without foundation. State corporate law traditionally governs the relationship between a corporation's separate
management and ownership elements. Unlike transactions between a
corporation and its shareholders, however, tender offers involve transactions between the target company's shareholders and an outside party. '
Therefore, tender offers are distinguishable from certain internal
mechanisms for achieving control changes such as proxy solicitations to
which the intracorporate matters doctrine applies.2 8 Since neither the
intracorporate matters rationale nor local interests in shareholder protection justify the burdensome impact of state takeover statutes on interstate commerce, the Kidwell line of cases correctly invalidated state
takeover statutes on commerce clause grounds.0 9
,' MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 500; Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at
1283; see State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 529; note 205 supra.
I MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 500; Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at
1285; State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, supra note 131, at 529; Wilner & Landy,
supra note 199, at 16-17.
,1 See, e.g., Boehm, supranote 199, at 742-43; Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role
of State Takeover Legislation: The Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 722, 741-45
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Shipman]; A Response To Great Western, supra note 131, at
931-34.
See Boehm, supra note 199, at 742-43.
"' Shipman, supra note 203, at 741-45; A Response To Great Western, supra note 131,
at 932.
' MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 501; Hi-Shear Indus. Inc. v. Campbell. [Current
Matters Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,804, at 90,033. The Kidwell court expressly rejected the rationale that a tender offer is an intracorporate matter. 577 F.2d at 1280 n.53.
' Id. Wilner & Landy, supra note 197, at 16-17; Note, Commerce Clause Limitations
upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 U. S. CALIF. L. REV. 1133, 1154 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Commerce Clause Limitations].
Proxy contexts involve the transfer of voting rights rather than transfers of ownership. Therefore, state regulation of proxy contests under the intracorporate matters doctrine effects only a corporation and its existing shareholders. In contrast to proxy contests,
a tender offer involves existing shareholders of the target and an outside bidder. Thus, the
intracorporate matters doctrine is not applicable to tender offers. Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 207, at 1154-55.
Although not expressly relied on by the Kidwell line of decisions, state takeover
statutes may constitute discriminatory economic protectionism. The practical effect and
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The recent line of cases adopting Kidwell also supports the proposition that the Williams Act preempts any state takeover statute which
unduly delays tender offers, strays from the regulatory neutrality of the
Williams Act, or otherwise impairs investor decision-making autonomy.21 Several commentators, however, have criticized the preemption
rationales set forth in the Kidwell line of cases."' These commentators
argue that Congress' purpose in enacting the Williams Act was investor
protection, rather than the maintenance of regulatory neutrality.2 12
These commentators further reason that a state's advance disclosure,
pre-offer hearing, and administrative review provisions are entirely consistent with Congress' goal of investor protection.213
Although legislative history does not indicate that perpetuation of
regulatory neutrality was the ultimate purpose of the Williams Act," 4
the Act's history does show that Congress considered regulatory neutrality essential to investor protection."5 By disrupting through delay
unstated intent of most state takeover statutes is to insulate the incumbent management of
targets from attack and thereby retain business in the state. Commerce Clause Limitations,
supra note 207, at 1159; see Wilner & Landy, supra note 197, at 18-19. This purpose is subject to challenge under the theory that the protection of state industry against takeovers is
analogous to invalid discrimination against out-of-state businesses in favor of local concerns.
See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970) (requirements that foreign
company's business operations be performed in regulating state invalidated as violation of
commerce clause); Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 207, at 159. Cf Great W.
United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1282 (protection of incumbent management by takeover
statutes would be impermissible).
2' Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, [1980-81 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,731, at 98,835-37; MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 490-98; 577 F.2d at 1279-81. See also
Crane Co. v. Lam [Current Matters Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,896, at 90,532-35
(enjoining enforcement of Pa. takeover act).
2"1See, e.g., Boehm, supra note 208, at 749-751; A Response To Great Western, supra
note 12, at 906-17; State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, supra note 131, at 517-24.
Commentators criticizing preemption challenges to state takeover statutes have observed
that recent Supreme Court decisions considering preemption have been highly solicitous of
state interests. See A Response To Great Western, supra note 11, at 906; see, e.g., Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (Maryland statute prohibiting oil companies from owning gasoline stations not preempted by Robinson-Patman Act); Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (Ohio trade secret law not preempted by federal patent law); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973) (reconciliation of state and federal regulations if possible held to be proper approach in preemption cases).
212See Boehm, supra note 199, at 749-50; A Response To Great Western, supra note 12,
at 913-15. The Supreme Court has held recently that the sole purpose of the Williams Act is
investor protection. See Piper v. Chris Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977).
23 See A Response To Great Western, supra note 12, at 901-02; State Tender Offer
Statutes Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 523-24.
21' During the Senate Committee hearings on the Williams Act, SEC Chairman Cohen
emphasized that investor protection was the only purpose of the bill. See Piper v. Chris
Craft Indus., Inc. 430 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1977).
2I Senator Williams, the author of the Williams Act, stated that the drafting committee designed the bill to benefit shareholders by providing tender offerors and target companies equal opportunity to present fairly their cases. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st
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the delicate balance between tender offerors and targets, state takeover
statutes obstruct the accomplishment of Congress' chosen scheme of investor protection.21 Moreover, delay-causing advance disclosure and preoffer hearing provisions frustrate the investor protection purpose of the
Williams Act by denying shareholders the right to tender their shares at
a premium.217 Since state takeover statutes stand as an obstacle of the
accomplishment of the purpose of the Williams Act, the Williams Act
preempts the state laws." 8
Taken together, the SEC's promulgation of rule 14d-2(b) and the
Kidwell line of cases cast serious doubts on the future of state tender offer regulations. Many state takeover statutes that contain advance
disclosure and mandatory waiting period provisions conflict impermissibly with SEC rule 14d-2(b)." 9 Although states can amend their
Sess. 3 (1969). In connection with the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), the House Report stated that the Williams
Act was designed to maintain a neutral policy towards cash tender offers. H.R. REP. No.
94-1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2572,
2644. The reason for this regulatory neutrality was congressional recognition that tender
offers often benefit investors and that a statute which discouraged offers would deprive
investors of the opportunity to tender their shares at a premium. Id.; H.R. REP. No. 1711,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2813. Prior to
the enactment of the Williams Act, Congress rejected proposed tender offer legislation that
contained advance notice requirements. See MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 496 n.22;
Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1277. Although this rejection does not indicate that Congress intended to bar the states from adopting advance disclosure requirements, the rejection does illustrate Congress' intent to preserve the efficiency of tender offers. Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 216 [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,731,
at 98,837; MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 497; Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d
at 1279-80; see Langevoort, supra note 131, at 252; Wilner & Landy, supra note 197, at 29.
By passing burdensome takeover statutes, states diminish the incentives for potential bidders to produce privately market information on possible targets. See Fischel, supra note
12, at 13. This decrease in market information undermines the efficiency of securities
markets. See id. at 4; see also note 198 supra
...
See note 217 infra.
217Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,731,
at 98,837; MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 497-98; Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577
F.2d at 1279-80. Where the quantity of information that an offeror must disclose under state
law greatly exceeds the amount of information that a bidder must reveal pursuant to
federal law, the state mandated disclosures may injure investors by causing greater
shareholder confusion. 577 F.2d at 1280-81.
ZG In addition to preemption and commerce clause challenges, state takeover statutes
may be difficult to justify under the first amendment. U.S. Const. amend. I. The Smith court
noted that the recently expanded scope of the first amendment commercial speech doctrine
limits the ability of states to control under corporate laws commercial speech. [1980
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,731, at 98,837 n.10. Under Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980), a state restriction on corporate
speech can be no more extensive than the state interest the restriction advances. Id. at
2351. Assuming, therefore, that the solicitation of shareholders to tender their shares is
commercial speech, state takeover statutes must advance a sufficiently counterbalancing
state interest.
2,9 See text accompanying notes 26-30 infra.
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takeover statutes to eliminate this preemptive conflict, 22 state takeover
statutes will still be vulnerable to constitutional challenges under the
Kidwell line of cases."' Moreover, the SEC's apparent ability and inclination to promulgate rules such as 14d-2(b) that preempt state takeover
statutes may result in the Williams Act becoming the limit of tender offer regulation. 2
KENNETH

B. TILLOU*

' See text accompanying notes 104-114 infra.
"' See text accompanying notes 192-218 infra.
I In response to a request by Senators Williams, Proxmire, and Sarbanes that the
SEC review the adequacy of federal takeover laws, the SEC has recently proposed legislation that would expressly preempt state takeover statutes. See [1980] 42 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) 28-29 (special supplement).
* Text accompanying notes 66-103 supra, contributed by Lizanne Thomas.

